Energy
Energy operators are under harder cyber standards from TSA, FERC, and NERC than at any time in the last decade, while IT/OT convergence accelerates and state-aligned actors target exactly the infrastructure they run. We design IT/OT architectures that meet NERC CIP and TSA SD requirements without breaking operations.
Overview
IT/OT convergence under TSA, NERC CIP, and unrelenting regulator scrutiny.
The Pressure
Energy is under harder cyber standards than at any point in a decade — and it's a named target.
- Pipeline operators now fall under TSA Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02D, with cyber requirements that rival defense-subcontractor levels.
- Electric utilities are absorbing NERC CIP-013 (supply chain), CIP-015 (internal network monitoring), and ongoing CIP-008 incident reporting.
- Renewables and DER face FERC Order 887 and the integration challenges of distributed energy resources at the grid edge.
- State-aligned actors, per CISA advisories, are pre-positioning in US electric, water, and pipeline OT — a clear and present threat, not a hypothetical.
- AI for grid optimization is accelerating but introduces new control-system trust and integrity questions.
The Gap
Most programs were built for IT and never genuinely bridged into OT.
- Generic SOCs cannot triage SCADA, ICS, or DCS signals — they alarm on normal operational patterns and miss the genuinely anomalous ones.
- Patch programs cannot be applied to OT the way IT applies them, leaving compensating-control gaps unaddressed.
- NERC CIP audit findings repeat every cycle because the program is documentation rather than operational discipline, and CIP-013 supply-chain requirements are met at attestation level rather than evidence level.
- IT/OT convergence projects often degrade safety posture because the OT side was not represented in the architecture decisions.
- The converged risk register FERC Order 887 expects looks different at every utility, and most cannot name a single owner accountable for it.
How We Help
We secure IT/OT convergence without breaking operations — and sustain it after deployment.
- Design IT/OT architectures that meet NERC CIP, TSA SD, FERC, and IEC 62443 expectations without disrupting the process.
- Map Technology & Security Audit and GRC to the actual frameworks — CIP-002 through CIP-014, TSA SD2021-02D, IEC 62443 — as operational discipline, not documentation.
- Run a 24/7 SOC with OT-aware tuning that distinguishes a normal SCADA pattern from a genuine compromise.
- Engineer Backup & DR to the immutability and recovery-time requirements OT environments demand, with evidence packs that hold at FERC audit and NERC CIP enforcement.
- Pre-position a Breach Retainer that knows the difference between an IT and an OT incident, led by people who have run security inside utility CISO teams.
Close the recurring CIP findings, pass TSA inspection, and keep the lights on while you do it.
Capabilities
What we deliver
IT/OT Architecture
Network segmentation between corporate IT and operational technology. Industrial DMZ design for utilities, pipelines, refineries.
TSA & NERC CIP Compliance
Implementation of TSA Pipeline directives, NERC CIP for bulk electric systems, and related energy-sector requirements.
OT Asset Inventory
Discovery of SCADA, DCS, PLC, RTU, IED, and grid edge assets. Critical for any defense program.
Industrial Incident Response
IR with safety priority — restoring operations without compromising worker or environmental safety.
Vendor & Field Tech Access
Privileged access management for vendors and field technicians. Time-bound, audited, least-privilege.
Cyber-Physical Risk Assessment
How a cyber event becomes a physical event. Shutdown logic, safety instrumented systems, grid reliability.
Protect your operations and your reputation
Let's talk about your IT/OT security, TSA compliance, or NERC CIP posture.